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Machine Intelligence Research Institute
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Introduction to Effective Altruism
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Central examples
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The empiricist-theorist false dichotomy
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Guarded definition
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Strained argument
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Perfect rolling sphere
If you don’t understand something, start by assuming it’s a perfect rolling sphere.
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Strictly factual question
A “question of strict fact” is one which is true or false about the material universe (and maybe some math) without introducing any issues of values, perspectives, etcetera.
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Fallacies
To call something a fallacy is to assert that you think people shouldn’t think like that.
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Psychologizing
It’s sometimes important to consider how other people might be led into error. But psychoanalyzing them is also dangerous! Arbital discussion norms say to explicitly note this as “psychologizing”.
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Conceivability
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Bulverism
Bulverism is when you explain what goes so horribly wrong in people’s minds when they believe X, before you’ve actually explained why X is wrong. Forbidden on Arbital.
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Emphemeral premises
When somebody says X, don’t just say, “Oh, not-X because Y” and then forget about Y a day later. Y is now an important load-bearing assumption in your worldview. Write Y down somewhere.
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Multiple stage fallacy
You can make an arbitrary proposition sound very improbable by observing how it seemingly requires X, Y, and Z. This didn’t work for Nate Silver forecasting the Trump nomination.
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Mind projection fallacy
Uncertainty is in the mind, not in the environment; a blank map does not correspond to a blank territory. In general, the territory may have a different ontology from the map.
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Invisible background fallacies
Universal laws also apply to objects and ideas that may fade into the invisible background. Reasoning as if these laws didn’t apply to less obtrusive concepts is a type of fallacy.
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Gotcha button
A conversational point which, when pressed, causes the other person to shout “Gotcha!” and leap on what they think is a weakness allowing them to dismiss the conversation.
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Explicit Bayes as a counter for 'worrying'
Explicitly walking through Bayes’s Rule can summarize your knowledge and thereby stop you from bouncing around pieces of it.
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Coherent decisions imply consistent utilities
Why do we all use the 'expected utility' formalism? Because any behavior that can't be viewed from that perspective, must be qualitatively self-defeating (in various mathy ways).
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Coherence theorems
A 'coherence theorem' shows that something bad happens to an agent if its decisions can't be viewed as 'coherent' in some sense. E.g., an inconsistent preference ordering leads to going in circles.
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Logical decision theories
Root page for topics on logical decision theory, with multiple intros for different audiences.
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An Introduction to Logical Decision Theory for Everyone Else
So like what the heck is 'logical decision theory' in terms a normal person can understand?
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Introduction to Logical Decision Theory for Analytic Philosophers
Why "choose as if controlling the logical output of your decision algorithm" is the most appealing candidate for the principle of rational choice.
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Introduction to Logical Decision Theory for Computer Scientists
'Logical decision theory' from a math/programming standpoint, including how two agents with mutual knowledge of each other's code can cooperate on the Prisoner's Dilemma.
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Introduction to Logical Decision Theory for Economists
An introduction to 'logical decision theory' and its implications for the Ultimatum Game, voting in elections, bargaining problems, and more.
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Newcomblike decision problems
Decision problems in which your choice correlates with something other than its physical consequences (say, because somebody has predicted you very well) can do weird things to some decision theories.
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Prisoner's Dilemma
You and an accomplice have been arrested. Both of you must decide, in isolation, whether to testify against the other prisoner--which subtracts one year from your sentence, and adds two to theirs.
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True Prisoner's Dilemma
A scenario that would reproduce the ideal payoff matrix of the Prisoner's Dilemma about human beings who care about their public reputation and each other.
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'Rationality' of voting in elections
"A single vote is very unlikely to swing the election, so your vote is unlikely to have an effect" versus "Many people similar to you are making a similar decision about whether to vote."
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99LDT x 1CDT oneshot PD tournament as arguable counterexample to LDT doing better than CDT
Arguendo, if 99 LDT agents and 1 CDT agent are facing off in a one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma tournament, the CDT agent does better on a problem that CDT considers 'fair'.
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Absent-Minded Driver dilemma
A road contains two identical intersections. An absent-minded driver wants to turn right at the second intersection. "With what probability should the driver turn right?" argue decision theorists.
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Death in Damascus
Death tells you that It is coming for you tomorrow. You can stay in Damascus or flee to Aleppo. Whichever decision you actually make is the wrong one. This gives some decision theories trouble.
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Newcomb's Problem
There are two boxes in front of you, Box A and Box B. You can take both boxes, or only Box B. Box A contains $1000. Box B contains $1,000,000 if and only if Omega predicted you'd take only Box B.
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Parfit's Hitchhiker
You are dying in the desert. A truck-driver who is very good at reading faces finds you, and offers to drive you into the city if you promise to pay $1,000 on arrival. You are a selfish rationalist.
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Toxoplasmosis dilemma
A parasitic infection, carried by cats, may make humans enjoy petting cats more. A kitten, now in front of you, isn't infected. But if you *want* to pet it, you may already be infected. Do you?
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Transparent Newcomb's Problem
Omega has left behind a transparent Box A containing $1000, and a transparent Box B containing $1,000,000 or nothing. Box B is full iff Omega thinks you one-box on seeing a full Box B.
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Ultimatum Game
A Proposer decides how to split $10 between themselves and the Responder. The Responder can take what is offered, or refuse, in which case both parties get nothing.
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Fair problem class
A problem is 'fair' (according to logical decision theory) when only the results matter and not how we get there.
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Guide to Logical Decision Theory
The entry point for learning about logical decision theory.
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Updateless decision theories
Decision theories that maximize their policies (mappings from sense inputs to actions), rather than using their sense inputs to update their beliefs and then selecting actions.
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Evidential decision theories
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Causal decision theories
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Modal combat
Modal combat
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A quick econ FAQ for AI/ML folks concerned about technological unemployment
Yudkowsky's attempted description of standard economic concepts that he thinks are vital for talking about technological unemployment and related issues.
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Ambitious vs. narrow value learning